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Introduction 
Prescription drug expenditures make up less than 10 percent of 
total personal health care expenditures in the United States, but 
over the last decade the amount that Americans spend on 
prescription drugs has grown much faster than any other 
component of personal health care (see Appendix Figures 1 and 
2). For example, between 1999 and 2000, hospital care costs rose 
about 5 percent, physicians and clinical services 6 percent, while 
prescription drug expenditures climbed more than 17 percent. In 
dollar amounts, prescription drug expenditures doubled, from $61 
billion to $122 billion, between 1995 and 2000. 
Is this an unwarranted expense that needs to be controlled, or 
does it represent increased value, as pharmaceuticals substitute 
for older, more costly treatments? What is the prevalence of 
health insurance coverage for prescription drugs, and how does 
this affect specific populations who have limited or no drug 
benefits? What are the components of drug prices? And what do 
we need to consider when we design health care policy? 
Stephen Soumerai and Patricia Danzon look at several aspects of 
pharmaceutical drug usage and pricing in the United States, 
illustrating their observations with their published research 
findings. They then briefly review recent legislative proposals to 
broaden public insurance coverage for prescription drugs and 
make their own policy recommendations. 
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Stephen Soumerai 
There is a strong economic and public health rationale for 
guaranteeing access to prescription drugs. For many people, 
access to prescription drugs is highly correlated with adequate 
insurance coverage for outpatient prescription drugs. If we look 
only at the aggregate growth of insurance coverage, we don’t see 
the problems that certain subgroups of Americans have obtaining 
adequate health insurance: older people, poor people, and those 
who are underinsured. 
Uninsurance 
An estimated 38.7 million Americans (14 percent of the total 
population) were without any form of health insurance in 2000, 
down slightly from the previous year (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). 
This decline in lack of coverage was widespread and affected 
most demographic groups, with one significant exception: among 
Americans with income between the poverty line and 125 percent 
of poverty, the share without health insurance increased two 
percentage points, from 25 to 27 percent, between 1999 and 
2000. And the share of poor and minority Americans without 
health insurance remained well above the national average: 19 
percent of African Americans, 32 percent of Hispanics, and 30 
percent of poor Americans lacked health insurance of any kind in 
2000. 
Underinsurance 
The original Medicare, the public health insurance program that 
covers virtually all older Americans, was designed to provide 
coverage for the big health care expenses that people faced in 
1965, mainly hospitalization and doctors’ treatments. But it does 
not include outpatient prescription drug benefits. Extremely low-
income Medicare beneficiaries may qualify for Medicaid, which 
covers prescription drugs. Other Medicare beneficiaries who 
want drug coverage have to purchase supplemental insurance 
(Medigap), switch from fee-for-service Medicare to a Medicare 
HMO, or qualify for prescription discounts under one of the state 
sponsored plans (like New York’s Elderly Pharmaceutical 
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Insurance Coverage, EPIC). Some pharmaceutical manufacturers 
have begun to offer their own discount plans for low-income 
seniors (Pear and Petersen 2002). Yet a disturbing number of 
Medicare beneficiaries have limited or no drug benefits. 
Bruce Stuart and his colleagues, using data from the Medicare 
Current Beneficiary Survey, analyzed the sources and duration of 
prescription coverage maintained by Medicare beneficiaries in 
1995 and 1996. They chose a two-year period to distinguish true 
losers and gainers from those who move into and out of coverage 
over time, and to capture changes at the beginning of the calendar 
year (Stuart, Shea, and Briesacher 2001). They found that 
although about 70 percent of all beneficiaries had coverage at 
some time in the first year, and even more had coverage at some 
time over both years, fewer than half (46.3 percent) had 
continuous drug coverage over the full two-year period. Thus, 
about 30 percent of the sample had gaps in their prescription 
coverage at some point during the two years. 
Even the 46 percent who have continuous coverage don’t always 
have access. Some Medicaid programs cap the number of 
prescriptions as low as three per month. Two-thirds of Medicaid 
programs require copayments ranging from $0.50 to $5.00 per 
prescription (National Pharmaceutical Council 2000). The three 
standard Medigap policies with drug benefits (H, I, and J) have a 
$250 deductible, 50 percent coinsurance, and a $1,250/$3,000 
annual cap (HCFA 2001). Even Medicare HMOs, to which many 
Medicare beneficiaries have turned for drug benefits, are starting 
to clamp down on those benefits in an effort to stay afloat (Rector 
2000). 
Appendix Table 1 illustrates out-of-pocket costs per year for 
pharmaceutical drugs under different types of insurance 
coverage, based on a hypothetical total of $2,000 per year over 
55 prescriptions (DHHS 2000, Table 2-23). The Medicaid 
recipient, with a $2.00 copay per prescription, pays $110; the 
Medicare beneficiary with Medigap H, I, or J pays an average of 
$1,125; and the Medicare beneficiary with no supplemental 
insurance pays the entire $2,000 out of pocket. 
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Copays, coinsurance, caps, and other limits on prescription drug 
coverage are particularly burdensome for three vulnerable 
populations: the elderly, the poor, and those with multiple 
chronic health problems. As Adams, Soumerai, and Ross-Degnan 
wrote in 2001, “A Medicare drug benefit that includes high cost 
sharing without catastrophic coverage is likely to miss the 
poorest and sickest” (p. 276). 
Adverse Impact of Limited Drug Coverage on Vulnerable 
Populations 
What are the adverse effects of limited drug coverage, based on 
the evidence from the best controlled studies? In low-income 
populations, it reduces use of clinically important medicines like 
insulin and cardiac medications, and it increases use of 
institutional services like hospitalization and nursing home 
admissions, which tend to be permanent among the elderly. 
Among schizophrenic patients and other groups with chronic 
mental illnesses, it increases day hospital use and acute mental 
health and emergency mental health care. A series of three 
studies in The New England Journal of Medicine (Soumerai et al. 
1987, 1991, 1994) strongly suggest that coverage limits increase 
total health care costs for these at risk patients. 
Soumerai and colleagues conducted several analyses comparing 
changes in prescription drug usage of both essential and 
nonessential drugs, among Medicaid beneficiaries in New 
Hampshire under two different regimes in the 1980s (a three 
prescription per month cap during one year, replaced by a $1 
copayment the following year) and New Jersey, which had no 
cap (Soumerai et al. 1987, 1991, 1994; Fortess et al. 2001). Their 
first study (1987) used data from 48 months of claims in both 
states, including a baseline period. Among more than 10,000 
continuously enrolled patients in New Hampshire, the imposition 
of a monthly three-prescription cap reduced the number of 
prescriptions filled by 30 percent; no change was noticed during 
the same time period in the comparison state. Those who used 
multiple prescriptions, predominantly female and elderly or 
disabled, were hardest hit; their filled prescriptions dropped by 46 
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percent. When a $1 copayment replaced the cap, most 
prescription fills returned to nearly the same level as before the 
cap, but not for patients receiving multiple drugs. 
In 1991 Soumerai and colleagues reported the effects of the same 
New Hampshire Medicaid drug benefit cap on the health of 
Medicaid recipients aged 60 and older who were taking three or 
more medications per month before the cap, including at least 
one maintenance drug for certain chronic diseases, compared to a 
similar sample in New Jersey. Again, prescription drug usage 
declined substantially, by 35 percent, among the New Hampshire 
sample when the cap was imposed. This decline was associated 
with a significantly increased risk of admission to nursing homes, 
although not to hospitals. When the cap was discontinued, the use 
of medications returned to nearly pre-cap levels, and the added 
risk of admission to a nursing home ceased. However, nothing 
could turn back the clock: the authors note that, “in general, the 
patients who were admitted to nursing homes did not return to the 
community” (p. 1072). This was the first time that a study 
actually demonstrated a link between coverage policies and an 
outcome like permanent institutionalization. 
Three years later they looked at the effects of the New Hampshire 
Medicaid cap on the use of psychotropic drugs and acute mental 
health care services by permanently disabled, noninstitutionalized 
Medicaid recipients diagnosed with schizophrenia, ages 19 
through 60 years of age (Soumerai et al. 1994). Imposition of the 
cap resulted in “immediate reductions (range 15 to 49 percent) in 
the use of antipsychotic drugs, antidepressants and lithium, and 
anxiolytic and hypnotic drugs....It also resulted in coincident 
increases of one to two visits per patient per month to 
[community mental health centers] (range of increase 43 to 57 
percent)...and sharp increases in the use of emergency mental 
health services and partial hospitalization (1.2 to 1.4 episodes per 
patient per month), but no change in the frequency of hospital 
admissions. After the cap was discontinued, the use of 
medications and most mental health services returned to base-line 
levels.” During the cap there was an increased use of emergency 
mental health services that are only provided in New Hampshire, 
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a special service to prevent institutionalization for people who are 
having a psychotic episode. This indicates that a coverage cap 
can actually cause psychotic episodes among schizophrenic 
patients, because these services were only provided for people 
who had severe schizophrenic illness occurring at that time. 
Furthermore, in this study the cap clearly had a negative effect on 
overall Medicaid program costs: “the estimated average increase 
in mental health care costs per patients during the cap ($1,530) 
exceeded the savings in drug costs to Medicaid by a factor of 
17.” 
Tamblyn and colleagues took a somewhat different approach, 
looking specifically for adverse events, “defined as the first 
occurrence of acute care hospitalization, long-term care 
admission, or death” (2001, 424), among low-income and elderly 
beneficiaries of a Canadian public insurance program in the 
1990s. In 1996, the province of Quebec legislated mandatory 
drug insurance coverage for all residents. To finance their 
program, they instituted a deductible and 25 percent coinsurance 
for all recipients, including low-income and elderly persons who 
had previously received free prescription drugs. (Bear in mind 
that the current legislative proposals in the U.S. Congress are 
more like 50 percent cost sharing.) The random sample included 
94,000 elderly persons and 55,000 low-income adults with 
Medicaid benefits. Data were drawn for periods before and after 
the deductible and coinsurance requirements were imposed. After 
cost sharing was introduced, use of both essential and 
nonessential prescription drugs dropped in both populations, 
although not as significantly as in the New Hampshire samples. 
The authors observed that “increased cost sharing for prescription 
drugs had the desired effect of reducing the use of less essential 
drugs but also the unintended effect of reducing the use of drugs 
that are essential for disease management and prevention” (p. 
427). The rate of serious adverse events associated with reduced 
use of essential drugs increased from 5.8 per 10,000 person-
months to 12.6 in the elderly sample, and from 14.7 to 27.6 in the 
low-income sample. Emergency department visit use rates 
associated with reductions in the use of essential drugs also 
increased by 14.2 per 10,000 person-months in elderly persons 
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and by 54.2 among the low-income persons (Tamblyn et al. 
2001). 
Policy Recommendations 
The Kaiser Family Foundation has published a comparative study 
of all of the proposals for drug benefits for Medicare 
beneficiaries that are being discussed in Congress (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2001). We’re dealing here with political viability. 
We’re dealing with Democrats who want to have universal 
coverage, and Republicans who want more private coverage and 
more selective coverage for vulnerable people. What has 
happened, however, is that the majority of proposals now favor 
thin, which means not very good, universal coverage. Why? 
Political exigencies are forcing us to cover everybody, but we 
can’t afford it. It’s as simple as that. 
Congressional proposals say, in a nutshell, let’s provide really 
thin coverage to everybody, even those people who don’t 
necessarily need it. High deductibles, and catastrophic coverage 
so that after $4,000 to $6,000 of out-of-pocket costs people then 
will get coverage. Rely on the self-purchase private insurance 
market, despite the fact that these private plans have very high 
cost sharing and result in less use of essential medications. All of 
these systems are voluntary, which are political realities, I guess. 
In 1999, Dennis Ross-Degnan and I wrote in The New England 
Journal of Medicine that the time was ripe for “a federal-state 
program to cover poor, near-poor, and low-income Medicare 
beneficiaries who are ineligible for Medicaid....Such an 
incremental approach would target the elderly and disabled 
persons with the greatest economic and clinical need, would build 
on existing federal-state programs, and would be affordable” 
(page 722). We referred to the demise of the Catastrophic 
Coverage Act as a missed opportunity, the failed Clinton Plan for 
health care as a missed opportunity, and now we’ve got a new 
opportunity. Let’s not blow it again. We need a bipartisan 
compromise. We went to Washington and talked to a lot of 
senators and aides about this problem; they said we’ve got to 
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compromise or else nothing’s going to happen. At that time, we 
said that with the current budget surplus, as well as bipartisan 
concern about drug costs and coverage, it’s time to act 
responsibly and aggressively. 
Have we missed our chance? I hope not. There was a big chance 
a couple of years ago, but there was no compromise. I’m hoping 
that there will be a chance again soon. 
Ideally, everybody in Medicare—elderly, disabled people—
should have access to prescription drugs, and other people as 
well. But available solutions are controversial, and we need 
compromise. 
Our first principle is that poor and low-income people, maybe up 
to 200 percent of poverty, have an urgent need for an immediate 
unlimited benefit, because these are the people—we have data 
now from many environments and countries—for whom limited 
access to prescription drugs actually affects their health and 
ultimately their ability to live independently. Limited drug 
coverage, especially for low-income people, reduces uses of 
essential medications that doctors clearly do not want to see 
reduced, nor does the clinical literature. It increases adverse 
costly outcomes such as institutionalization, hospitalization, and 
even mortality. 
So what should be the priorities in coverage? To quote from our 
recent article in the Journal of General Internal Medicine: 
We recommend an approach that recognizes the 
urgent need of low-income beneficiaries for an 
unlimited benefit with low copayments. We estimate 
that a substantial portion of the costs of providing 
coverage to this group, whose lack of economic 
access to drugs results in low utilization and 
undertreatment of important chronic illnesses, would 
be offset by reduced use of institutional services. In 
addition, no one should become impoverished by the 
need for essential medications. The second priority 
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should be to provide universal protection against very 
high drug costs (e.g., after $3,000 in out-of-pocket 
costs). Such an approach will have a larger impact on 
health than thin coverage for everyone, including 
those who do not currently need any public 
assistance. (Soumerai, Adams, and Ross-Degnan 
2001, 865) 
An approach like this will have a larger impact on health than the 
so-called thin coverage that’s being promoted for all 
beneficiaries, with up to 50 percent cost sharing and huge 
deductibles. Even so, there are still going to be people at the 
borderline who will not get their medications. 
Patricia Danzon 
My doctorate is in economics, which is known as the dismal 
science. So, after the heartwarming and caring concern expressed 
by Steve, it is my less pleasant task to talk about some of the hard 
numbers, the business side of things. Both perspectives are very 
important, and I think that our views of the solutions are quite 
similar. 
Pharmaceutical Drug Spending Growth 
If we step back to ask what actually drove the increase in 
spending that was described in the introduction, and which has 
been quite out of line in the 1990s compared with previous 
trends, our analysis suggests: 
• the single most important factor driving this growth in 
spending is the growth of insurance coverage. 
The proportion of Americans with some form of health insurance, 
86 percent, has remained fairly constant for more than a decade. 
In 2000, about 238 million people in the United States were 
covered by some form of health insurance, including virtually 
everyone age 65 and older. But over the same time period an 
increasing fraction of both the under 65 and the over 65 
population obtained some drug coverage, primarily as private 
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insurers added outpatient prescription drugs to their standard 
benefits.(Danzon and Pauly 2001; Briesacher and Stuart 2002, 
Table 1). 
When we compared two population surveys, one done in 1987 
and the other in 1996, and we looked at the under 65 population, 
those who had at least one prescription and some insurance 
coverage increased from 51 percent to 83 percent. Most of the 
people in the under 65 population who had a prescription now do 
have coverage (Danzon and Pauly 2001). And the people who 
don’t have prescription drug coverage are primarily the people 
without any health insurance coverage, some of whom are young 
adults, ages 18 to 24. They were the least likely to have health 
insurance coverage, 72.7 percent, versus 86 percent overall, in 
2000 (U.S. Census 2000). Interestingly, in the senior population 
we also found that there was a dramatic increase in the 
percentage with coverage; this may have declined recently with 
the exit of HMOs from Medicare Plus Choice. 
Between 1965 and 1998, the proportion of prescription drug 
expenditures covered by private insurance increased from 
virtually nothing (3.5 percent) to slightly more than half (52.7 
percent), while the proportion paid out of pocket declined from 
nearly the entire amount (92.6 percent) to about one-quarter (26.6 
percent) (Figure 1). By comparison, over the last decade the share 
of total personal health expenditures, hospitals, and physicians 
paid out of pocket, has remained steady, at about 17 percent, 3.2 
percent, and 12.5 percent respectively (HCFA 2000). This 
massive shift from direct to indirect payment for prescription 
drugs is a major underlying cause of expenditure growth, as 
consumers and prescribing doctors become less aware of and less 
sensitive to the financial impact. 
I’m not saying that lack of drug benefits is not a problem. I am 
saying that during the 1990s there was an increase in coverage, 
which contributed significantly to the growth in spending. The 
fact is that when people have insurance they spend more, they use 
more prescriptions, and they have higher costs per prescription. 
To some extent this reflects what economists call the moral 
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hazard effect of insurance. We don’t mean it is immoral; we 
simply mean that when somebody else pays, you use more 
expensive drugs. And to some extent it reflects the fact that 
people, especially in the under 65 population who need coverage 
or need drugs, are more likely to buy coverage. This is called 
adverse selection, the tendency for people who need drugs or 
other medical services to buy insurance coverage for that service. 
Figure 1. Percentage of Drug Spending by Source of Payment:
Private Insurance, Out-of-Pocket, and All Others, 1965-1998
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Source: DHHS 2000, Table 2-30.
We estimate that about one-quarter of the real spending growth 
for outpatient pharmaceuticals between 1987 and 1996 is 
attributable to growth in insurance coverage (Danzon and Pauly 
2001). Although the United States is still far from having 
universal coverage, in fact there has been a big increase and that 
has, not surprisingly, contributed to the growth in spending. 
Volume, Mix Upgrade, and Unit Price 
In addition to the overall effect of increased prescription drug 
insurance benefits, three other factors contribute to increases in 
prescription drug spending: 
• Volume (utilization), the average number of 
prescriptions per capita, has increased. 
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• Mix upgrade, from older, less expensive drugs to newer, 
more expensive drugs. Some of these newer drugs replace 
existing treatments, and some treat diseases that were 
previously untreatable. Between 1986 and 1999, the 
number of New Molecular Entities (NMEs) approved by 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration increased (FDA 
2001). Among these are such drugs as Gleevec (for 
chronic myeloid leukemia, approved in 2001; for 
gastrointestinal stromal cancer, 2002), several new AIDS 
medications, Singulair (for asthma, 1998), Celebrex and 
Vioxx (arthritis, 1998 and 1999), Xenical (obesity, 1999), 
and of course Viagra (erectile dysfunction, 1998). Newer 
drugs tend to have higher prices, and the switch to new 
drugs raises expenditures. Of course many of these newer 
drugs offer improvements in long-term health and quality 
of life, but they also cost more. 
• Price inflation of existing drugs, which on average 
contributes the least to spending growth. 
Affordability 
Turning to the issue of affordability, we hear a lot about the 
prices of drugs. But for seniors the main issue is not prices but 
drug coverage. If seniors were able to enroll in managed drug 
plans, they would benefit from the same discount on prices as 
those of us who are already in managed drug plans. 
You may not be aware of this, but so-called pharmacy benefit 
managers (PBMs) negotiate significant discounts on prices with 
manufacturers. They also negotiate significant discounts on the 
pharmacy dispensing fees, all of which significantly reduce the 
price per script for people with managed drug coverage relative 
to people without. The anomaly in the United States is that the 
people without coverage pay relatively high prices and relatively 
high dispensing fees compared to those with coverage. That 
comes about simply because of the negotiating power of these 
pharmacy benefit managers and other managed care institutions 
that manage the pharmacy benefit. If seniors received this type of 
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managed benefit, they would benefit from lower prices. This is 
the way to approach the problem of affordability, as opposed to 
controlling prices, because pharmacy benefit managers do a good 
job of negotiating discounts, which makes price controls 
unnecessary. 
But if we expand coverage, then we have to recognize that 
insurance is a mixed blessing. While insurance gives people 
financial protection, the flip side is higher usage. In every type of 
medical service, people with insurance use more. We have to 
expect that as we expand insurance coverage, there will be more 
utilization, which will drive up expenditures. That is part of the 
battle going on in Washington; they recognize that having 
insurance coverage will drive up drug spending. 
Of course, there are ways to control costs once we have insurance 
coverage. The early generation managed care plans used tightly 
controlled formularies. They negotiated with the drug 
manufacturers for discounted prices and limited the number of 
products that were covered to those on the formulary. 
With the managed care backlash, there is now reluctance to have 
closed formularies, so PBMs are switching to greater reliance on 
copayments to control costs. The plans now use triple tier 
copayments, which require, say, $5.00 copayment for a generic 
drug, say $15.00 for a preferred brand, and maybe $25.00 or 
$30.00 for a nonpreferred brand. In some ways this managed care 
backlash is unfortunate, because we are moving to a form of 
insurance coverage that has a lot of copayment, hence more 
financial exposure for patients, rather than relying on the other 
controls that managed care once used. 
Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: An International Issue 
The single most important factor that distinguishes 
pharmaceuticals from other industries is the importance of R&D. 
The pharmaceutical industry spends 15 to 20 percent of their 
sales on R&D, compared to an industry average of about 4 
Lourie Lecture Policy Brief 
14 
percent (PhRMA 2001a). The average cost of bringing a new 
drug to market is now estimated at $800 million and upwards 
(DiMasi 2001). The reason the cost is so high is partly the cost of 
discovery and clinical trials to show that drugs are safe and 
effective. But it is also the cost of the failures, the so-called dry 
holes, that has to be averaged in with the cost of the successes. It 
takes a long time, 6 to 15 years, to take a drug all the way from 
discovery through clinical trials to market launch. 
The good news is that R&D now uses new technologies to 
develop new drugs. With biochemistry and genomics and rational 
drug design, new drug targets have enormous promise. But all of 
this is expensive, so the costs of R&D are projected to increase. 
The significant thing about the R&D costs, for purposes of 
pricing, is that R&D is a fixed and sunk cost. In other words, the 
cost must be incurred before the drug can be marketed, and then 
there is no incremental cost for every additional patient served. 
By contrast to the high cost of R&D, the marginal cost of serving 
additional patients, the cost of producing another pill, is very low. 
So the industry relies on patents to stop prices from falling 
because if prices fall to marginal cost, just the cost of production, 
nobody is paying for R&D and manufacturers would have no 
incentive or ability to invest in R&D for the future. Thus, 
intellectual property protection is crucial to the viability of the 
research-based pharmaceutical industry. 
R&D is also a joint cost, which is not just an issue for the United 
States but is also an enormous international dilemma. R&D, once 
done, can serve consumers anywhere in the world. So the 
question is, who will pay? There is no way of attributing R&D to 
the Italians or the U.S. or the U.K. For each country, there is a 
great incentive to free ride, to wait for somebody else to pay, and 
that is indeed what some countries with very tough price 
regulation do. They pay relatively low prices and contribute very 
little to R&D. But if everybody pays only marginal costs, then no 
one pays for the joint costs, and there will be no R&D. 
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The economic question is, what is the best way of organizing the 
payment for this joint cost of R&D? When you have a joint cost 
such as pharmaceutical R&D, or electric utility capacity, the most 
efficient pricing—the form of pricing that gives the highest 
overall social welfare—is differential pricing. Everybody does 
not pay the same price; prices differ across different patient 
groups, depending on their price sensitivity, or price elasticity of 
demand. Elasticity is measured by answering the question, how 
much would you cut back if you faced a higher price? The 
principle of differential pricing is that price sensitive consumers 
or countries should pay lower prices, and less price sensitive 
consumers should pay higher prices (Danzon 2001). 
Price Sensitivity 
It’s very difficult to measure price sensitivity, but in general it is 
highly correlated with income. Thus, one practical implication of 
this principle is that it is appropriate for higher income countries 
to pay higher prices for drugs, and for lower income countries to 
pay less. 
Differential pricing does not imply cost-shifting. As I wrote in 
1999: 
Simple economic theory shows that if a firm serves 
two separate customer groups, say A and B, that 
differ in their price sensitivity, the firm would 
maximize its overall net revenue by charging 
different prices in the two markets. It would charge a 
higher price in the market that is less price-sensitive, 
say market A, other things being equal. If demand in 
market B now becomes more price-sensitive, the firm 
will lower its price in that market. But the price to the 
less price-sensitive market A is unaffected—indeed, 
to raise price to group A would actually reduce net 
revenue, since by assumption it had already set the 
price to maximize net revenue in that market. By 
analogy, increased price-sensitivity in the managed 
care market has led suppliers to offer discounts in 
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that market, but this does not affect prices to other 
customers. (p. 23) 
A few years ago I reviewed studies that compared prices for 
pharmaceuticals in the United States and other countries (Danzon 
1999). The most recent studies claimed that the United States had 
prices 70 percent higher than Canada, or 102 percent higher than 
Mexico. But these widely cited price comparisons use small, 
unrepresentative samples—typically, 10 top branded products—
and faulty methods that lead to biased conclusions. These studies 
overstate U.S. prices because they do not include rebates given to 
managed care and government purchasers. Furthermore, more 
than 42 percent of drug purchases in the United States are 
generics, yet these are omitted from most price comparisons. 
We are undertaking a study at Wharton to look at a large sample 
of products, including the generics and the branded products. We 
have included all the different presentations and packs, calculated 
appropriate measures of price indices to compare prices, and 
looked at both manufacturer-level prices and the prices to final 
consumers. Unfortunately, we do not measure the discounts; they 
are confidential. It is too early to give the detailed results of that 
study, but I can give you some general findings. The first 
conclusion from our analysis is that there is no single right 
measure: we cannot accurately say that Canada is X percent 
cheaper than the U.S. But the general conclusion is that the 
previous studies have overestimated the average differences. The 
U.S., on average, has higher prices for new originator products, 
but the U.S. has the lowest generic prices in our sample of nine 
countries. The U.S. also has the lowest over-the-counter drug 
prices. So when you average it all in, the differences are smaller. 
Another finding is that countries with regulation have much less 
competition and do not have large generic shares or low generic 
prices. Regulation undermines competition. Interestingly, when 
we compare Canada not just to the U.S. but to other European 
countries, we find Canada has among the lowest prices. This 
reflects in part the decline in the Canadian dollar over the last 
decade. 
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Our final interesting finding was that although the U.S. does have 
higher prices somewhat on average than other countries, our 
differential for drugs is less than the differential on prices of 
other medical services such as hospital care and physician 
services. So the U.S. has higher prices for all types of medical 
care, not just drugs. 
Unfortunately, current policies are undermining the price 
differences that exist. The European Union permits parallel 
trade, in other words, wholesalers can import products from 
countries that charge lower prices to countries that charge higher 
prices for the same products. We in the United States are talking 
about permitting reimportation, in other words, permitting 
wholesalers to import products from countries with lower prices. 
Further, governments increasingly are regulating their domestic 
prices based on prices in other countries. This means that the low 
prices in lower income countries are now spilling over to higher 
income countries, which has the unfortunate effect of eliminating 
the low prices for low-income countries. Manufacturers are 
rationally becoming much less willing to give low prices in low-
income countries. 
This issue received broad coverage in the context of AIDS drugs 
in Africa, where the prices seem way out of line with the very 
low income levels there. The affluent countries look at the prices 
in these other countries and say “We want those low prices.” 
When that happens, manufacturers are unwilling to give anyone 
low prices. My conclusion is that uniform pricing is not efficient 
or equitable, and it leads to the severe problem of unaffordably 
high prices in lower income countries. 
This still leaves a question and a concern for the vulnerable 
populations who are low-income in this country. They also can 
not pay high prices in this country. We therefore have to be a lot 
more serious about finding a drug coverage program that really 
allows those people access. If we could get seniors into managed 
pharmacy coverage, they would benefit from the discounts that 
those with drug coverage already have, and they would not be 
facing prices as high as they currently do. 
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Furthermore, we should not address the problem of higher prices 
in this country by trying to import lower prices from abroad, 
which would very adversely affect lower income countries. We 
may well, because of the political process, find a way to pay 
lower prices in the United States, but if we do we will get less 
R&D and fewer new drugs. 
Policy Recommendations 
The examples that Steve has showed us tend to be from 
vulnerable populations who, if faced with copayments, will cut 
back on their use of drugs. For the more affluent populations, we 
know from studies of other types of medical care that as much as 
30 percent of the procedures done are inappropriate and not 
necessary. It suggests that insurance, which makes 
consumers/patients insensitive to cost, leads to overutilization 
and unnecessary use. The challenge in designing a drug benefit is 
providing enough coverage to benefit people who are really 
vulnerable, without encouraging overutilization or excessive 
switching to expensive, unnecessary drugs. 
There is no perfect solution. We agree that using copayments is 
inappropriate for the low-income and needy. However, it is a 
very appropriate way of giving choice to higher income people 
while constraining the overuse that results from moral hazard. 
Copayments should be targeted at upper income people who can 
afford them, while lower income people should be protected. 
We also agree that the coverage proposals proliferating in 
Washington, which would give seniors 50 percent copay up to 
about $4,000 or $5,000 worth of coverage, provide a very poorly 
designed drug benefit. A better drug benefit would give full 
coverage to lower income people, have significant cost sharing 
for higher income people, and catastrophic coverage. That is 
Insurance 101: insurance is supposed to protect people from 
expensive unpredictable events, not cover routine costs you can 
afford. 
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You may ask yourself, is it just that people in Washington do not 
understand these obvious principles of insurance? The 
unfortunate reality is that the reason they design these plans to be 
50 percent copay is that if instead a plan has a big deductible with 
no coverage until, say, $500 is spent, then the great majority of 
seniors would not see any benefit from their coverage. Therefore 
they would choose not to buy the plan. 
Everybody seems to agree that the coverage should be voluntary, 
not mandatory, because of the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act fiasco, which was a mandatory drug benefit. Many 
seniors opposed that vehemently because they did not want 
mandatory coverage in that form. Now, all the plans offer 
voluntary coverage. But if coverage is voluntary, then it is 
necessary to design the benefit so that the lower risk people will 
choose to buy the coverage. Otherwise only the sickest people 
will join the plan, which makes it costly and perhaps unstable. 
Politically it is not appealing if your political opponent can say 
“Your plan will only cover 50 percent of the people.” 
The fact that the plan only pays benefits to 50 percent of the 
people is not a design defect, because most people will not have 
drug expenses high enough to reach the limit of the deductible, 
which triggers benefit payment. 
Unfortunately, political constraints are leading us toward a very 
poorly designed drug benefit. The worst case scenario could be 
that we have a poorly designed benefit, which is very 
comprehensive for some people, and then we add price controls 
because the cost escalates beyond budgeted levels. That would be 
a very unfortunate resolution of the drug coverage debate. But 
political forces, as opposed to ignorance of insurance principles, 
are driving us in that direction. 
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Appendix Tables and Figures 
Appendix Figure 1. Personal Health Care Expenditures,
Aggregate Amounts, by Type of Expenditure
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Appendix Figure 2. Personal Health Care Expenditures, Average Annual 
Percentage Change, by Type of Expenditure
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Source: Authors’ calculations, using HCFA 2000, Table 2. 
Source: HCFA 2000, Table 2. 
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Appendix Table 1. Illustration of Out-of-pocket Costs under Different Coverage Sources for a 
Beneficiary with Total Spending of $2,000 
Source of drug coverage Deductible Copay Over cap Total out-of-
pocket 
Percent paid 
out-of-pocket 
HMO ($7.50 copay, $1,500 
cap)1 --  $412  $88  $500  25%  
Medigap H/I/J ($250 
deductible, $1,250 or $3,000 
cap, 50% coinsurance) 2 $250  $875  -- $1,125  56%  
Employer ($7.50 copay)1 -- $412  -- $412  21%  
Medicaid ($2 copay)1 -- $110  -- $110  6%  
Medicare FFS only -- -- -- $2,000 100%  
Notes: 
1For non-Medigap plans, typical cost sharing rules are assumed; there are plans with higher 
and lower cost sharing. The $2,000 spending was divided by the average cost of prescriptions 
for Medicare beneficiaries with drug coverage ($36.37) to generate the number of 
prescriptions (55) used for the examples in this table. The cap on HMO payments applies to 
spending by the plan.  
2 For Medigap plans, out-of-pocket spending in this table is calculated directly from the dollar 
amount of spending ($2,000). After the beneficiary has met the $250 deductible, Plans H and I 
will cover 50% of $2500 in total spending, for a total plan payment of $1250. Plan J will pay a 
total of $3000. 
This table does not attempt to account for premiums paid or the different purchasing power 
that $2000 might have under different discount arrangements negotiated by HMOs, 
employers, and Medicaid.  
Source: DHHS, Report to the President: Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending, Utilization, 
and Prices, April 2000, Table 2-23. 
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